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I. INTRODUCTION
To pretend that arbitration has not evolved into different animals
of the same species is to not fully appreciate the nuances that exist
within the system.  To date, most U.S. cases surrounding arbitration
agreements and enforcement are resolved within and under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA).  While this makes sense in many in-
stances, arbitration has grown—with the support of the courts—into
areas of law and life never intended by the drafters of the FAA.  Pre-
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tending that the FAA provides adequate protections for parties in a
significantly weaker bargaining position when faced with a contract of
adhesion that contains a mandatory arbitration clause is to demon-
strate a lack of understanding of the realities these situations present.
Businesses are accused of using arbitration as a private dispute reso-
lution system that shields their transgressions from public scrutiny,
uses arbitrators and institutions that are perceived as biased, and pre-
vents any real means of justice to the consumer.  Something must be
done to ensure that consumers facing mandatory arbitration clauses
within contracts of adhesion are protected from businesses that seek
to use arbitration as an advantageous means to resolve disputes.  The
American public, a section of Congress, and the arbitration commu-
nity are all responding, but out-of-date law and recent decisions are
thwarting their efforts.  It is time for Congress to act, but in doing so it
must recognize that old biases toward the use of arbitration will not
move the discussion forward.  Congress must seek to address the use
of arbitration in consumer contracts without creating new issues by
prohibiting the use of arbitration in its entirety and/or by attempting
to protect consumers from contract clauses that do not seek to enhance
the power imbalance that is inherent within contracts of adhesion.
Recognition of these needs will allow Congress to draft a narrowly fo-
cused, minimally regulatory law that cuts to the heart of the issue: the
protection of a specific group of weaker parties entering into contracts
of adhesion that contain significantly one-sided arbitration clauses.
This Article will seek to address these issues by first identifying
the issues relating to the FAA, the surrounding case law, and the al-
ternative readings of section 2 of the FAA.  The Article will then ex-
amine and reject some of the early attempts at addressing those issues
while considering current attempts by both academics and industry to
address the issue of contracts of adhesion and arbitration clauses.
The Article will conclude, in Part III, by considering who should be
protected, identifying what they should be protected from and how
those protections can be accomplished.  Finally, the Article will claim
that Congress must seek to protect a narrow class of individuals from
significantly disadvantageous arbitration clauses within contracts of
adhesion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Expanding Beyond the Original Scope of the FAA
When the issue first arose in 1980, the commercial arbitration
community approved of the U.S. Supreme Court’s expansion of the
scope of the FAA to cover all commercial law disputes where the par-
ties had agreed to arbitration.  But at the time, “commerce” was a
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term not yet fully explored and defined within the context of the
FAA,1 and the widespread use of arbitration was decades away.
The FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements.2  Today, some authorities argue
that the judicial attitude toward arbitration agreements has shifted
into a substantially pro-arbitration attitude.3  While this is not neces-
sarily a problem, one must appreciate that this attitude arises from a
federal act that is significantly out of date and was never designed to
be applicable in a pro-arbitration world.  In the most general sense, if
a contract dealing with interstate commerce contains an agreement to
arbitrate, the FAA requires that the arbitration agreement be en-
forced,4 unless generally applicable contract principles render the
agreement unenforceable.5  The FAA thus forbids courts called upon
to enforce agreements to arbitrate from imposing special burdens on
arbitration agreements, but permits courts to hold those agreements
to the same standards that all contracts must meet.
But this understanding of the enforceability of arbitration clauses
was a hard-fought battle.  At the time of adoption, the FAA and the
language embodied within the Act was far from clear.  In fact, even
the simplest of terms had to undergo court definitional developments
while the scope of the statute was defined.6  In many ways, these defi-
nitions represent one of the many methods of expansions of the scope
of the FAA.
As Margaret Moses writes:
1. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (“This case
concerns the reach of § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.  That section makes en-
forceable a written arbitration provision in ‘a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce.’  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011) (emphasis added).  Should we read this
phrase broadly, extending the Act’s reach to the limits of Congress’ Commerce
Clause power?  Or, do the two italicized words— “involving” and “evidencing”—
significantly restrict the Act’s application?  We conclude that the broader reading
of the Act is the correct one . . . .”).
2. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983) (“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements . . . .”); Margaret L. Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in
Charge?, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 147 (2010) (arguing that recent judicial activism
has widened the scope of the FAA).
4. JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS, STEFAN KRO¨LL, COMPARATIVE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ¶ 7-95, at 163 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2003) (“US
Courts have consistently held that given the strong federal policy in favor of arbi-
tration . . . no waiver should be assumed.”).  Of course, this is the issue to be
discussed in relation to AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011). See notes 40–55 and accompanying text.
5. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011).
6. For an interesting exploration of the history, specifically in terms of the New
York Convention and the FAA, see Richard W. Hulbert, The Case for a Coherent
Application of Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 45
(2011).
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The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) that Congress adopted in 1925 bears
little resemblance to the Act as the Supreme Court of the United States has
construed it.  The original Act was intended to provide federal courts with
procedural law that would permit the enforcement of arbitration agreements
between merchants in diversity cases.7  The Supreme Court’s construction of
the statute, especially in the last twenty-five years, amounts to a judicially
created legislative program, imposed without congressional input, that has
vastly expanded the reach and focus of the original statute.8
It is important to note, as Professor Moses highlights, challenges to
the scope of application of the FAA have continued into the modern
era.  By 1985, some sixty years after the adoption of the FAA, many
state courts continued to remain hostile toward the use of arbitration9
or became hostile toward the FAA itself.  This hostility resulted in a
hodge-podge of state cases and legislative enactments that seemed to
defy or at least push the grey area of the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.  In response to the growing lack of consistency, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Southland Corp. v. Keating,10 held that the FAA’s
mandates apply not only to federal courts but also to state courts.11
The Southland Corp. decision was not the end of the debate, however,
as many state courts and legislatures remained hostile to the use of
arbitration and sought to find more creative means to get around the
Supreme Court’s determination.  The resistance to the application of
the FAA in state courts came to a head in 1994, when the attorneys
general of twenty states12 filed amicus briefs in the case of Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,13 asking the Supreme Court to over-
7. Margaret L. Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge?, 40 SETON HALL L. REV.
147, 147 (2010) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924)); see also Arbitration of
Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J.
Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 5–10 (1924) (describing the
purpose of the FAA as to provide an inexpensive way to resolve disputes of
merchants or of anyone engaged in buying and selling).
8. Moses, supra note 7.
9. For example, as recently as 1995, courts remained hostile toward arbitration, see
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 265, in which the Supreme Court wrote: “Several state
courts and Federal District Courts, like the Supreme Court of Alabama, have
interpreted the Act’s language as requiring the parties to a contract to have ‘con-
templated’ an interstate commerce connection.” Id. at 269; see, e.g., Burke Cnty.
Pub. Schs. Bd. of Ed. v. Shaver P’ship, 303 N.C. 408, 417–20, 279 S.E.2d 816,
822–23 (1981); R. J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 7 Kan.
App. 2d 363, 367, 642 P.2d 127, 130 (1982); Lacheney v. Profitkey Int’l, Inc., 818
F. Supp. 922, 924 (E.D. Va. 1993).  Several federal appellate courts, however,
have interpreted the same language differently, as reaching to the limits of Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause power. See, e.g., Foster v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38, 40 (10th
Cir. 1986); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,
406–07 (2d Cir. 1959); cf. Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 417–18 (7th Cir. 1984).
10. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
11. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. 1 (“Congress intended to foreclose state legislative
attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”).
12. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272.
13. Id. at 265.
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turn its decision in Southland Corp.14 and to permit the States to en-
force state (anti) arbitration statutes.15  The Supreme Court declined
to reverse its ruling in Southland Corp.16 and instead took the oppor-
tunity to reaffirm its determination by clearly specifying the obliga-
tions of the states with regard to arbitration clauses:
States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general
contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause “upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
What states may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all
its basic terms (price, service, credit) but not fair enough to enforce its arbitra-
tion clause.  The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of
policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal “footing,” directly con-
trary to the Act’s language and Congress’ intent.17
In case there remained any doubters, the Supreme Court pro-
claimed the following year that state rules that “undermine the goals
and policies of the FAA” are preempted by the FAA.18  The die had
been cast; arbitration agreements were to be treated on equal footing
as other contracts, even by the states, despite judicial or legislative
attempts to the contrary.  Of course, this is only the beginning of the
story.  This series of cases,19 and the more recent case of AT&T Mobil-
ity LLC v. Concepcion,20 has caught the legal and academic worlds in
14. See id. at 272.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 281 (internal citation omitted).
18. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
19. Professor Hayford lays out the cases (prior to AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion) that
made up the preemption groundwork.  These cases are: Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Doctor’s Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265
(1995); Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). See Stephen L. Hayford, Fed-
eral Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues Under the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 69–70 (2001).
20. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (“Although § 2’s
saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, nothing in it sug-
gests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the FAA’s objectives.”).  This case has garnered a large amount of
attention for a long period of time.  For example, the Wall Street Journal pub-
lished a blog article back on Nov. 8, 2010—prior to the Supreme Court ruling in
the case. See Ashby Jones, Is D-Day Approaching for Class-Action Lawsuits?,
WALL ST. J. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2010, 3:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/11/08/is-
d-day-approaching-for-class-actions-lawsuits/.  These authors, and many others,
question if this case signals the end of class-wide arbitrations.  The tenor of the
Journal’s assertions has not changed since the rulings. See Jess Bravin, Court
Gives Business New Shield Against Class Actions, WALL ST. J., April 28, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870409970457628892257593591
8.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court
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a federal preemption argument based on Congress’s intent and expan-
sive definitional arguments under the FAA.  The outcome of these de-
bates impacts everyone in ways probably never envisioned by
Congress in 1925.
B. The FAA as Creating a Federal Preemption
To understand the federal preemption argument, one must begin
by examining the language of the Federal Arbitration Act.  The FAA
section 2 provides, in part: “A written provision . . . to submit [speci-
fied disputes] to arbitration . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”21  It is first important to note that while
one could argue (as many have)22 that section 2 of the FAA is a matter
of procedure and not substantive law, the Supreme Court made clear
in Southland Corp. v. Keating23 that section 2 should be considered a
substantive provision.24  Consequently, section 2 is to be considered a
matter of substantive federal legislation, thus giving it the potential to
displace state law.  The question then becomes, in what situations
should the displacement of state law occur?
In the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion25 the court used a frequent and long-established standard
in situations where the preemption is not expressed but implicit
Allows Contracts That Prohibit Class-Action Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, April 27,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/business/28bizcourt.html.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011).
22. In fact, this was one of the seminal issues in Southland Corp., in which Justice
O’Connor argued that Congress viewed the Arbitration Act “as a procedural stat-
ute, applicable only in federal courts.” Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 25
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).  However, the majority of the Court noted, “If it is cor-
rect that Congress sought only to create a procedural remedy in the federal
courts, there can be no explanation for the express limitation in the Arbitration
Act to contracts ‘involving commerce.’” Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 14 (citing 9
U.S.C. § 2).  However, the dissent also drew attention to the language of the
House Report on the FAA:
“Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a ques-
tion of procedure . . . .”  [H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924)].  On the floor of
the House, Congressman Graham assured his fellow Members that the
FAA “does not involve any new principle of law except to provide a sim-
ple method . . . in order to give enforcement . . . .  It creates no new
legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agree-
ment in commercial contracts and in admiralty contracts.”  [65 CONG.
REC.1931 (1924).]
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 26.
23. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
24. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24; Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.
25. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (“Although § 2’s saving clause preserves gener-
ally applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve
state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s
objectives.”).
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within legislation.  Within this analysis, state law will be preempted
when the law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”26  Consequently,
when courts are called upon to determine the enforceability of an arbi-
tration clause they must consider the purposes and objectives that
Congress had in mind when enacting the FAA.
There have been several objectives and purposes advanced for Con-
gress’s enactment of the FAA.  The Supreme Court has frequently de-
scribed the FAA and specifically section 2 as reflecting both a “liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration”27 and the “fundamental principle
that arbitration is a matter of contract.”28  The result of these two
enumerated objectives has created a strong federal policy in favor of
arbitration and a strong policy in favor of enforcing the parties’ arbi-
tration agreement as specified in the contract.  These policies have
gone so far as to allow courts to enforce arbitration agreements even
when some of the important terms have been omitted.  In fact, some
argue that the mere inclusion of the phrase “parties may refer any
dispute under this Agreement to arbitration” within an otherwise
pathological clause will most likely still result in the parties arbitrat-
ing their claim as the courts are likely to determine the phrase as a
clear expression of the parties’ intent to arbitrate.29
The courts have granted much latitude to the parties and the
choices they make within their arbitration agreement.  In fact, courts
have gone so far as to allow parties to limit the issues subject to arbi-
tration,30 to arbitrate according to specific rules,31 and to limit with
whom a party will arbitrate its disputes.32  As the Supreme Court
enumerated in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto: “By enacting § 2
[of the Federal Arbitration Act] . . . Congress precluded States from
singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring in-
stead that such provisions be placed ‘upon the same footing as other
26. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
27. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
28. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010).
29. This phrase is taken from the case of Canadian National Railway Co. v. Lovat
Tunnel Equipment Inc., 174 D.L.R. 4th 385, 122 O.A.C. 171, 37 C.P.C. 4th 13
(Ont. C.A. 1999).  Of course, this clause will create numerous problems for the
parties as the court will most likely now have to assist them in setting up the
arbitration.
30. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
31. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Board of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989).
32. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774 (2010).
Some argue the Stolt-Nielsen case has added to the confusion. See, e.g., Diana M.
Link & Richard A. Bales, Waiving Rights Goodbye: Class Action Waivers in Arbi-
tration Agreements After Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International, 11 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 275 (2011).
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contracts.’”33  One should not misunderstand this statement, nor fail
to appreciate the controversy that this phrase has created within the
legal world.  Clearly, the primary intention of this statement is to en-
sure that arbitration agreements are to be enforced as written and
treated in the same manner as all other contracts.  The question then
becomes a question of definition: what is meant by the phrase “same
footing as other contracts”?  Moreover, does this phrase allow the vari-
ous permutations of contract law amongst states to creep into the
courts’ consideration?34  And if so, when do state arbitration and/or
contract provisions infringe upon federal law, specifically the FAA?
The Supreme Court has been reasonably clear in enumerating sev-
eral contract doctrines states can use to resolve enforceability deter-
minations in relation to arbitration clauses, such as rules in relation
to contract formation.35  The Court has also been clear, until recently,
in allowing the application of state-driven contract defenses.36  For ex-
33. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (quoting Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
34. In terms of unconscionability, states and courts have tried various means to reign
in the significantly one-sided arbitration clauses within contracts of adhesion.
For example, in the case of class action waivers, see Skirchak v. Dynamics Re-
search Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding class waiver unconscion-
able because it would “result in oppression and unfair surprise to the
disadvantaged party”); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing class waiver unconscionable because one-sided); Hall v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
608 F. Supp. 2d 592, 603–04 (D.N.J. 2009) (finding arbitration provisions uncon-
scionable because likely amounts of individual recovery were small and company
was effectively immunized “from claims that would be suitable for class action
resolution”); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 373 (N.C.
2008) (holding that class waiver, together with other provisions in arbitration
agreement, rendered agreement unconscionable; the class waiver “contribute[d]
to the financial inaccessibility of the arbitral forum” and “contribute[d] to the
one-sidedness of the clause because the right to join claims and pursue class ac-
tions would benefit only borrowers”); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000,
1004 (Wash. 2007) (recognizing that majority of jurisdictions uphold class action
waivers but citing cases from fifteen jurisdictions holding that class action waiv-
ers in arbitration agreements were substantively unconscionable); Vasquez-Lopez
v. Beneficial Oregon, Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 951 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (holding class
waiver unconscionable because it was “unilateral in effect and . . . gives defen-
dant a virtual license to commit, with impunity, millions of dollars’ worth of
small-scale fraud”).  In fact, “It has been estimated that around 40% of unconscio-
nability defenses to arbitration agreements have met with success in recent
years.”  Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen,
Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 323, 352 n.174 (2012), [hereinafter Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration
Trilogy] (citing Karen Halverson Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide Unconscio-
nability Challenges, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2011)).
35. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
36. Until the AT&T Mobility case, “Courts have become increasingly likely in recent
years to find class arbitration waivers in consumer product sales unenforceable
due to the lack of incentives for consumers and their attorneys to recover for ‘low-
value’ claims.”  Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the
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ample, in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,37 the Supreme Court
specified: “[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, du-
ress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements without contravening § 2.  Courts may not, however, in-
validate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to
arbitration provisions.”38  Recently, however, the application of the
Doctor’s Associates reasoning has been called into question in the case
of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion39 in which the Supreme Court
arguably removed the doctrine of unconscionability from the analysis
of arbitration agreements.
At the heart of the AT&T Mobility40 case is an arbitration clause
that “required that claims be brought in the parties’ ‘individual capac-
ity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or
representative proceeding.’”41  This clause, although clear on its face,
is subject to a specific California law that prohibits class action waiv-
ers in situations that arise from contracts of adhesion, when the dis-
pute involves a small amount of damages, and the party with the
superior bargaining power has devised a scheme to deliberately cheat
large numbers of consumers individually out of small sums of
money.42  In this particular instance, the California District Court
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals both determined that the arbi-
tration clause fell within the California law which prohibited class ac-
Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solu-
tions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 477
(2009).
37. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
38. Id. at 687 (internal citations omitted). See also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A.
v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 555–56 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]n
arbitration clause may be invalid without violating the FAA if . . . the provision is
unconscionable.”).
39. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).  The California courts have long used unconscionability to
strike down arbitration clauses within employment contracts.  For example, the
California Supreme Court in the seminal case of Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000) used unconscionability doc-
trine as the basis for considering what procedural protections would be essential
requisites for the arbitration of statutory discrimination claims under an employ-
ment agreement.  The approach of the California courts has been criticized. See
Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doc-
trine: How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39 (2006).  However, some commentators have argued that
the approach of the California courts in protecting consumers should be ap-
plauded. See, e.g., Amy M. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empir-
ical Data in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 127–133
(2010).
40. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
41. Id. at 1744 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a). See generally Hans Smit, Class
Actions and Their Waiver in Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 199 (2004).
42. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 2009) (relying upon
Discover Bank v. Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)).
2013] IT IS TIME THE LAW PROTECTS CONSUMERS 675
tion waivers, and as such, the clause was deemed unconscionable.43  It
is the application of this particular California law that bumps up
against a possible issue in relation to the enforceability of arbitration
clauses and the issue of federal preemption.44  All of the courts that
reviewed this case prior to the Supreme Court recognized the poten-
tial of preemption by the FAA in instances such as those presented in
the case.45  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals enumerated, in rela-
tion to express preemption:
[I]f a state-law ground to revoke an arbitration clause is not also applicable as
a defense to revoke a contract in general, that state-law principle is pre-
empted by the FAA.  However, “because unconscionability is a generally appli-
cable contract defense, it may be applied to invalidate an arbitration
agreement without contravening § 2 of the FAA.”46
And in relation to implicit preemption: “Neither does the FAA im-
pliedly preempt California unconscionability law . . . .  ‘Discover Bank
placed arbitration agreements with class action waivers on the exact
same footing as contracts that bar class action litigation outside the
context of arbitration.’”47
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made clear, the state law in
question is nothing more than a refinement of the unconscionability
doctrine,48 which is applicable to all contracts.49  As such, the law in
43. See Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255,
at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008); Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th
Cir. 2009).
44. It is not as though the “California” issue had not been considered before.  See
Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California’s “Unique” Approach to Arbi-
tration: Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of
Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61 (2005);
Jonathan R. Bunch, To Be Announced: Silence from the United States Supreme
Court and Disagreement Among Lower Courts Suggest an Uncertain Future for
Class-Wide Arbitration, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 259 (2004).
45. See Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255,
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008); Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th
Cir. 2009).
46. Laster, 584 F.3d at 855 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Shroyer v. New
Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2007)).
47. Laster, 584 F.3d at 857 (citing Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc.,
498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007)).
48. “Standing alone, ‘unconscionability’ is a very slippery notion indeed.”  Charles
Rickett, Unconscionability and Commercial Law, in COMMERCIAL LAW: PERSPEC-
TIVES AND PRACTICE, ¶ 9.4, at 168 (John Lowry & Loukas Mistelis eds., 2006).  In
general, unconscionability may be either procedural or substantive or, more com-
monly, both. Substantive unconscionability refers to contract terms that are “un-
reasonably favorable” to one side.  Procedural unconscionability deals with the
process of contract formation rather than the specific terms of the contract.  It
encompasses “not only the employment of sharp practices and the use of fine
print and convoluted language, but a lack of understanding and an inequality of
bargaining power.” See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (2d ed. 1990).
Most states require a finding of both substantive and procedural unconscionabil-
ity. See John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA.
676 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:666
question would not be preempted by federal law as it is part of the
state’s generally applicable contract defenses.50  The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, had a different view in relation to the application of
L. REV. 930, 932 (1969).  However, the current position has been explained and
clarified in the text of U.C.C. § 2-302(1): “If the court as a matter of law finds the
contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable re-
sult.”  On the importance of U.C.C. § 2-302, see Paul M. Morley, Commercial De-
cency and the Code—The Doctrine of Unconscionability Vindicated, 9 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1143 (1968) (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn’s testimony in the 1954
Report of the N.Y. Law Revision Commission: Hearings on the Uniform Commer-
cial Code 121), describing this section as “the most valuable section in the entire
Code.” See also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Em-
peror’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) (discussing the drafting and
legal history of U.C.C. § 2-302 and the importance of the clauses).  For considera-
tion specific to an arbitration clause, see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Un-
conscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1001, 1001 (1996).
49. California is not the only state and/or court to consider the doctrine of unconscio-
nability in relation to arbitration agreements.  The cases are numerous. See, e.g.,
G.R. Homa v. American Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 229–32 (3d Cir. 2009) (class
action waiver in credit card agreement unconscionable); Chalk v. T-Mobile USA,
Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1096–98 (9th Cir. 2009) (class action waiver made entire
arbitration clause unconscionable since waiver provision was “not severable”);
Laster v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 854–57 (9th Cir. 2009) (class action
waiver made arbitration clause unconscionable; FAA did not expressly or im-
pliedly preempt California law governing unconscionability); Kaneff v. Del. Title
Loans, Inc. 587 F.3d 616, 624–25 (3d Cir. 2009) (arbitration clause in car loan
agreement requiring debtor to arbitrate all disputes but allowing lender to repos-
sess through court channels or self-help, containing class action waiver, provision
for sharing of costs, and filing fee was not unconscionable under state law); Cicle
v. Chase Bank, 583 F.3d 549, 555–56 (8th Cir. 2009) (arbitration clause in credit
card agreement containing waiver of class action not unconscionable under Mis-
souri law).  And academics have long weighed in on the debate. See generally,
Alexander J. Casey, Arbitration Nation: Wireless Services Providers and Class
Action Waivers, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 15 (2010); Yongdam Li, Applying the
Doctrine of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitration Agreements, with Em-
phasis on Class Arbitration/Arbitration Waivers, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 665
(2010); Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced
Legislative Response, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 361 (2010); William H. Baker, Class Ac-
tion Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 335 (2009); Richard M. Alder-
man, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act: It’s All About Separation
of Powers, 12 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 151, 154 (2009) (discussing the recent at-
tack on consumer arbitration by consumer advocates and the widely criticized
“additional problem . . . that an arbitration clause may preclude the use of the
class actions device”); Heather Bromfield, Comment, The Denial of Relief: The
Enforcement of Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 315 (2009); Diana M. Link & Richard A. Bales, Waiving Rights Goodbye:
Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements After Stolt-Nielsen v.
AnimalFeeds International, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 275 (2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685297.
50. See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.
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the state law.  The Supreme Court clarified that the standard of
“equal footing” is not overcome by merely making the law applicable to
all contracts.51  Instead, the standard of determination is whether the
law stands as an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.”52  The Court determined
that in this instance the use of the unconscionability doctrine “inter-
feres with arbitration.”53  It came to this determination by reasoning:
When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim,
the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.
But the inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine normally thought to
be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant here, unconscionability,
is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.54
The Supreme Court highlighted that the mere fact that the law
applies to all contracts does not eliminate the need to examine the
impact that the law has upon arbitration.  This, I would argue, is the
turning point in the analysis.  The Court was clear: one has to be con-
cerned with the impact the law will have upon the enforcement of ar-
bitration clauses.  This particular intention of the Supreme Court has
been noted before, for example in the case of Perry v. Thomas55 in
which the court noted that federal preemptions “might extend even to
grounds traditionally thought to exist ‘at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract.’”56  Consequently, in this regard, the Court
seems to have laid out a two-tier test: (1) the law must be applicable to
all contracts, and (2) must not have a disproportionate impact on the
enforcement of arbitration clauses.
The practical effect of the Supreme Court’s determination in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion57 is that the Concepcions and all others
wishing to join the class will now need to arbitrate the dispute as indi-
viduals—not as a class.  Many commentators, academics, and con-
sumer groups argue that the AT&T Mobility decision has signaled the
end of class-action arbitrations in consumer-based contracts.58  Ac-
51. See id. at 1748.
52. See id. at 1753 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
53. Id. at 1750.  The court continued, “Although the rule does not require classwide
arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to demand it ex post.” Id.
54. Id. at 1747 (internal citations omitted).
55. 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987).
56. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492
(1987)).
57. Id. at 1750.
58. For example, see Alessandro Presti, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion: End of Class
Action Litigation as We Know It? Or Much Ado About Nothing?, CBLR ONLINE,
(May 9th, 2011), http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/11739, and the SCOTUSblog,
which hosted a symposium on the issue with guest authors, including: Terry Mo-
ritz, AT&T Mobility and the end of consumer class action through Commerce
Clause jurisprudence: Not so fast;  Michael Rubin, Class actions in the wake of
Concepcion; David Schwartz, Do-it-yourself tort reform: How the Supreme Court
quietly killed the class action; Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion:
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cording to Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.: “This is
the latest in a series of cases where five conservative justices have
hampered the rights of consumers to be protected by state laws.”59
And as Deepak Gupta, a Public Citizen attorney who represented the
Concepcions, remarked: “Now, whenever you sign a contract to get a
cell phone, open a bank account or take a job, you may be giving up
your right to hold companies accountable for fraud, discrimination or
other illegal practices.”60  Of course, the Supreme Court has done
nothing of the sort.  The business community may seize upon the
Court’s determination to turn this ruling to its advantage, but the
Court has been consistent in its approach toward arbitration clauses.
Moreover, the Concepcions (and others) did agree to the arbitration
clause as written, with a specific exclusion of class-wide arbitration.
As the Supreme Court previously enumerated in the Stolt-Nielsen
case,61 class-wide arbitration cannot be done absent consent of all of
the parties concerned.62  In this instance, AT&T Mobility and those
From unconscionability to vindication of rights; Jill Gross, AT&T Mobility, FAA
preemption and class arbitration; Hiro Aragaki, Status and contract in AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion; Christopher Drahozal, Concepcion and the Arbitration
Fairness Act, SCOTUSblog: Symposium on Arbitration, DISPUTING, http://www.
karlbayer.com/blog/?p=15714 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).
59. Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court Deals Potentially Fatal Blow to Class Action Arbi-
trations, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202491943426&slreturn= 1&hbxlogin=1.
60. James R. Hood, End of Class Actions? Supreme Court Oks AT&T Arbitration
Clause, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.consumeraffairs.
com/news04/2011/04/end-of-class-actions-supreme-court-upholds-at-t-arbitration
-clause.html.  Similar sentiments were expressed by Gupta and others in numer-
ous newspaper articles. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Companies can block custom-
ers’ class-action lawsuits, Supreme Court rules, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2011), http://
articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/28/business/la-fi-court-class-action-20110428;
Coyle, supra note 59.
61. As enumerated in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion: “In that case we held that an
arbitration panel exceeded its power under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA by imposing
class procedures based on policy judgments rather than the arbitration agree-
ment itself or some background principle of contract law that would affect its
interpretation.  We then held that the agreement at issue, which was silent on
the question of class procedures, could not be interpreted to allow them because
the ‘changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action
arbitration’ are ‘fundamental.’ ” AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 (internal cita-
tions omitted).
62. “The conclusion follows that class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by
Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.” AT&T Mo-
bility, 131 S. Ct. at 1751–50.  The Stolt-Nielsen case, although presenting an is-
sue of the absence of a class action arbitration clause, is nonetheless enlightening
on the Court’s impression of class action arbitration.  “[T]he differences between
bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume,
consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties’ mere si-
lence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their
disputes in class proceedings.”  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 130
S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010).
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similarly situated as AT&T Mobility did not consent to class-wide ar-
bitration—a fact that is readily apparent in the arbitration clause it-
self.  The case should also be distinguished from cases in which an
employee is faced with an arbitration clause inserted into an employee
handbook that is given to them years after their original date of em-
ployment.  Unlike these types of situations, the Concepcions did have
a genuine choice in determining their cell phone provider and the
clause was not inserted or significantly modified post-agreement.  The
arbitration clause was not disguised, hidden, or otherwise inconspicu-
ous.  Moreover, the clause is incredibly consumer-friendly63 despite its
prohibition on class-wide arbitration.  But one certainly cannot disa-
gree with the reality of the situation: businesses are most likely going
to seize upon this ruling to eliminate class-action arbitration.64
However, it may just be that the Supreme Court has left a window
open by stating: “The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the
text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceed-
ings.”65  The Court’s extension of the basic purpose of the FAA into a
goal “to facilitate streamlined proceedings” is an interesting one.  One
has to ask—why does the Court go this far?  Why not just leave it at
“enforce contracts as written,” for this would have resolved the issue
63. See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
64. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.  Courts may have already extended
the doctrine that arises in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, sometimes well beyond
the courts stated intentions. See, e.g., Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 812 F.
Supp. 2d 1042, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Concepcion forecloses plaintiffs from ob-
jecting to class-action waivers in arbitration agreements on the basis that the
potential cost of proving a claim exceed potential individual damages.”).  How-
ever, several courts have already applied AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion in a
straightforward manner. See, e.g., Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d
1205 (11th Cir. 2011) (determining that an arbitration agreement identical to the
one in AT&T Mobility was enforceable despite arguments in relation to Florida
public policy).  And some courts have distinguished AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
so as to avoid its application, see, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litiga-
tion, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2011), where the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida found arbitration agreements with class-ac-
tion waivers to be unenforceable on substantive unconscionability grounds de-
spite AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.  In this situation, the court wrote,
“Concepcion has not relieved courts from their obligation to scrutinize arbitration
agreements for enforceability on a case-by-case basis where one party resists ar-
bitration; rather, Concepcion provides guidance as to what courts may consider
when fulfilling that obligation.” Id. at 1373.  And NAACP of Camden County
East v. Foulke Management Corp., 24 A.3d 777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011),
in which the court declined to enforce an arbitration agreement because the ma-
jority opinion in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion did not leave litigants bereft of
other contract defenses, including the procedural unconscionability question of
contract formation or contract interpretation principles.  It is not a stretch to im-
agine, the debate surrounding the interpretation and application of AT&T Mobil-
ity v. Concepcion is far from over.
65. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (emphasis added).
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in AT&T Mobility.  There can be little question in light of the FAA
that state legislatures and courts should not be allowed to expand con-
tract doctrines and defenses in a manner that appears on its face to
apply to all contracts but which in reality has a disproportionate im-
pact on arbitration agreements.  Is the Court also suggesting that
there are limits on how far the law can go when specifying the struc-
ture, procedure, and process of arbitration?
The Court further stated: “The point of affording parties discretion
in designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined
procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”66  Again, this could be con-
sidered an unnecessary utterance as the Court has long-ago estab-
lished that arbitration is a creature of contract and as such parties
should be afforded discretion in the terms of their contract, with some
key limitations.  Why continue with this line of argumentation?  The
majority was clearly attempting to make a point relating to the dis-
sent’s reasoning and the use of the Dean Witter Reynolds67 case.  In
the dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, took issue with the
Court’s inclusion of the “expeditious resolution of claims”68 as one of
the FAA’s overriding goals.69  In response, the majority made clear
that the FAA’s overriding goal is to “ensure judicial enforcement of
privately made agreements to arbitrate.”70  However, the Court went
on to note: “This is not to say that Congress was blind to the potential
benefit of the legislation for expedited resolution of disputes.  Far from
it . . . .”71  It is in these series of quotes that the majority opinion was
attempting to lay bare an important consideration for state and fed-
eral legislatures when designing laws that will impact arbitration
agreements.  The Court made clear that: “Arbitration is a matter of
contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expecta-
66. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1749.
67. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985).
68. See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1749.
69. See id. at 1749.
70. Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)).
71. Id. at 1749 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219
(1985)).  This is not the only time the Court has made such a statement.  For
example, “[Arbitration] trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”  Mitsub-
ishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); see
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Revelation and Reaction: The Struggle to Shape Ameri-
can Arbitration, in CONTEMP. ISSUES IN INT’L ARB. & MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM
PAPERS 2010, at 97 (Arthur W. Rovine ed. 2011) (under the same title in the PENN
ST. Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION (2011)); see generally Linda R. Hirschman, The
Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV.
1305 (1985) (discussing the broad reach of the FAA resulting from decades of pro-
arbitration Supreme Court jurisprudence).
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tions.”72  But what the parties in the aforementioned examples would
have agreed to is not arbitration as envisioned by the FAA, lacks its
benefits, and therefore may not be required by state law.73
The Court left little room for debate.  State law may allow the par-
ties to craft their arbitration agreement as they see fit, but it may not
alter the basic rules of contract in such a manner as to have a dispro-
portionate impact on the enforceability of an arbitration agreement,
nor may the law require the parties to participate in an arbitration
procedure that does not comport with the parties’ expectations of what
arbitration is to look like and accomplish.  The parties are free to alter
these expectations within their agreement; however, the state may not
unilaterally make the alteration.74
On the face of this conclusion, one can appreciate the position of
the Supreme Court and the well-supported conclusion that the Court
gave; however, this position ultimately leaves the states in a difficult
position as the Supreme Court’s decision makes it incredibly difficult
for states to regulate and/or protect consumers when they are faced
with contracts of adhesion containing significantly one-sided arbitra-
tion clauses.
C. The Potential Limits Within Section 2 of the FAA Should
Be Rejected
Unsurprisingly, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion75 was not a
unanimous decision, at least partially because the Justices held
widely different views on the reading and application of FAA section 2.
In fact, Justice Thomas in his concurrence argued that:
It would be absurd to suggest that § 2 requires only that a defense apply to
“any contract.”  If § 2 means anything, it is that courts cannot refuse to en-
force arbitration agreements because of a state public policy against arbitra-
tion, even if the policy nominally applies to “any contract.”  There must be
some additional limit on the contract defenses permitted by § 2.76
Justice Thomas then used rules of statutory interpretation to as-
sert that a clarification of some of the terminology within section 2 is
in order, specifically use of the term “revocation” within section 2
72. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130
S. Ct. 2772, 2774 (2010)).
73. Id. at 1752–53.
74. One should note, I do take on board and support the comments made by Justice
Breyer in his dissent.  At issue in the case is the enforcement of an arbitration
clause and not the appropriateness of class-wide arbitration. Id. at 1758.  In ad-
dition, the dissent make a very good point that much of the majority’s bias toward
class-wide arbitration seems to be based in half-truths and misinformation. Id.
One must therefore wonder if the court is really struggling with the enforcement
of an arbitration clause or trying to justify the limitation of class-wide
arbitration.
75. Id. at 1753.
76. Id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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without the often-corresponding terminology of “invalidations” and
“non-enforcement.”77  Justice Thomas argued that under rules of stat-
utory interpretation a “broader context”78 approach should be taken.
With this approach in hand, he went on to clarify the implications of
this style of interpretation in relation to the term revocation:
Reading §§ 2 and 4 harmoniously, the “grounds . . . for the revocation” pre-
served in § 2 would mean grounds related to the making of the agreement.
This would require enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate unless a party
successfully asserts a defense concerning the formation of the agreement to
arbitrate, such as fraud, duress, or mutual mistake.  Contract defenses unre-
lated to the making of the agreement—such as public policy—could not be the
basis for declining to enforce an arbitration clause.79
Justice Thomas argued that the intentional omission of terms such
as invalidations and non-enforcement lead to the reasonable conclu-
sion that the FAA, specifically section 2, was an attempt by Congress
to limit the enforcement of arbitration agreements that fail as a mat-
ter of formation, but to not support challenges based on the other de-
fenses to contract enforcement, such as public policy.
It does seem logical that Congress, in 1925, facing an “arbitration
hostile world,” must have considered the real possibility that hostility
toward arbitration could continue through the use of state-based laws
of public policy.  Certainly, Congress would not have allowed states to
create arbitration-hostile public policy rules relating to the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements.  It is not a great leap then to imagine
that Congress was attempting to ensure that arbitration agreements
were enforced as written and that challenges to the formation of the
agreement should be allowed, but hostile state public policy rules that
limited enforcement of the agreements as written would be forbidden.
Of course, the points that Justice Thomas raised must be appreci-
ated within the context of the Article.  Neither states nor Congress
should be supported in crafting laws or policies that return arbitration
policy to the old, pre-FAA days, when hostility toward arbitration was
the main belief and public policy was often used as the excuse to re-
fuse enforcement of an otherwise valid arbitration clause.  However,
whether one supports Justice Thomas’s argumentation turns on one’s
personal belief in the importance of the original intent theory of read-
ing federal law.  Yet one needs to appreciate that in the modern pro-
arbitration world one salient point must influence and impact Justice
Thomas’s line of argumentation: the absence of the drafters’ ability to
77. Id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
78. See id.
79. Id. at 1754–55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967) (interpreting § 4 to permit federal
courts to adjudicate claims of “fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause
itself” because such claims “g[o] to the ‘making’ of the agreement to arbitrate”)).
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foresee the eventual evolution and expansion of the use of arbitration.
As Justice Breyer pointed out in the dissent:
When Congress enacted the Act, arbitration procedures had not yet been fully
developed.  Insofar as Congress considered detailed forms of arbitration at all,
it may well have thought that arbitration would be used primarily where
merchants sought to resolve disputes of fact, not law, under the customs of
their industries, where the parties possessed roughly equivalent bargaining
power.80
Contracts of adhesion became a matter of academic debate in the
United States in 191981 and did not widely enter courts’ vocabularies
until 1965.82  There is little realistic argument that Congress consid-
ered either class-wide arbitration or contracts of adhesion when debat-
ing adoption of the FAA.  Consequently, while Justice Thomas’s
method of evaluating the language within the text of the FAA is legiti-
mate, the world of contracts has changed substantially and now in-
cludes contracts of adhesion and class actions—contracts that were
rare or did not exist in 1925.  While the argument based on the lan-
guage of the FAA is sound, it should not be allowed to close the debate
on new topics within the legal world.  The argument of Justice
Thomas highlighted the need for Congress to consider protecting cer-
tain classes of individuals that face substantially one-sided arbitration
clauses contained within contracts of adhesion.  These parties and
these types of contracts were not within the contemplation of Con-
gress when it adopted the FAA, and as such these issues must be ac-
counted for in new legislation.
D. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011 Is Not the Answer
Now more than ever, Congress needs to respond with legislation to clarify the
original intent of the Federal Arbitration Act.  In arbitration, there is no
transparency, nor is there an independent arbitrator.83
Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.
80. Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. See Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 882 n.10 (1962) (explaining that
the concept, although considered within French law in 1901, was introduced into
Anglo-American jurisprudence by Edwin W. Patterson in The Delivery of a Life-
Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919)).  The concept gradually found
its way into judicial opinions. See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd.,
(2d Cir. 1955) 221 F.2d 189, 204 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissenting); Neal v.
State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); Bekken v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc., 293 N.W. 200 (N.D. 1940).
82. Steven, 58 Cal. 2d at 882 n.10.  Even today, it is argued that “[u]ntil fairly re-
cently, judicial decisions grounded on unconscionability doctrine were few and far
between.”  Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy, supra note 34, at 352 (cit-
ing Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscio-
nability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 610 (2009)).
83. Coyle, supra note 59.
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The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011 (AFA)84 was introduced in
the House and Senate in mid-May 2011.  Of course, the introduction
was perilously close to the various summer recesses85 and the im-
pending need for Congress to raise the debt ceiling,86 so not much
happened in relation to the bill.  In fact, not much movement had oc-
curred on several occasions previously; however, this is the fourth
time87 that a bill of this type has been introduced,88 and as such, it
certainly deserves more than a little bit of attention.  Moreover, exam-
ination is necessary because the outcome of the AT&T Mobility deci-
sion made clear that any protections that are to be granted in favor of
consumers facing mandatory arbitration clauses within contracts of
adhesion must come from Congress.  As such, now more than ever,
Congress has to find a way to pass this type of legislation.
At the heart of the Arbitration Fairness Act are three main pro-
positions: (1) no pre-dispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or
enforceable if it requires arbitration of employment, consumer, or civil
rights,89 (2) decisions in relation to the validity and enforceability of
the agreement to arbitrate shall be determined by a court,90 under
federal law,91 and (3) a clause or portion of a clause that could be read
as a waiver to judicial enforcement of an employee’s rights arising
under the U.S. Constitution, a state constitution, a federal or state
statute, or related public policy shall be invalid.92
Congress appears to have singled out these specific areas for pro-
tection for three main reasons: (1) the nature of the FAA and the origi-
84. The House Resolution is available here: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.
xpd?bill=H112-1873.
85. See 2011 Congressional Calendar, 112th Congress, ROLL CALL, http://cdn.rollcall.
com/media/newspics/calendar120910.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).
86. For more about the debt ceiling issue, see Lori Montgomery, President Obama
Signs Debt-Limit Bill into Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2011, http://www.washing
tonpost.com/politics/senate-passes-debt-limit-bill/2011/08/02/gIQAIp2kpI_story.
html.
87. S. 3026, 107th Cong. (2001–02); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007–08); H.R. 1020,
111th Cong. (2009–10); S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011–12).
88. In the introduction to the 112th Congress, the Senate had seventeen co-sponsors
and the House had eighty-one—a decrease in support over the previous introduc-
tion. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011 (S. 987), GOVTRACK.US, http://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=S112-987 (last visited Aug. 13, 2012); Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act of 2011 (H.R. 1873), GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=H112-1873 (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
89. Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. § 402(a) (2011).
90. Id. § 402(b)(1).  This of course is one of the main issues in terms of the compe-
tence of the arbitrator as the general current rule is the arbitrator decides her
own competence (decides if the dispute is one for resolution in arbitration) unless
a defect that goes to the heart of the arbitration clause exists. See JULIAN D. M.
LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS, STEFAN KRO¨LL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION, ¶¶ 14-13 to 14-16, at 332–33 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2003).
91. Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. § 402(b)(1) (2011).
92. Id. § 402(b)(2).
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nal intent behind the Act, (2) the disparity of power between parties in
these type of situations, and (3) concerns with the arbitration system
itself.
In relation to concerns over expansion beyond the original intent of
the FAA, Congress directs its criticism specifically to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, writing that: “A series of decisions by the Supreme
Court of the United States have changed the meaning of the
Act . . . .”93  However, it clarifies that this concern arises in the nature
of the parties impacted by the expansion.94  Congress limits its criti-
cism by arguing that the FAA “was intended to apply to disputes be-
tween commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and
bargaining power.”95  Thus, the expansion of the scope of the FAA
may not be concerning except that the expansion impacts a class of
individuals that suffer from a weaker bargaining position.  It is inter-
esting to note that the 2009 version of the Act was more robust in
argumentation related to the disparity between the parties.  In the
2009 version of the bill, Congress advanced the argument by citing
pressures on private arbitration companies to support industry, the
repeat player syndrome, and proliferation of clauses that remove basic
legal and procedural protection from employees and consumers96 as
the reason that arbitration needs a higher level of policing when it
comes to weaker parties.  Although the language has been toned down
in the current version, it is clear these concerns remain at the heart of
many of the provisions within the Act.
While the expansion of the scope of the FAA has long been a con-
cern of industry, constitutional scholars, and academics within the ar-
bitration community, pointing out this problem without concrete
methods of addressing it is ineffective.  The AFA has no language, def-
inition, or even hint of any attempt to reign in the scope of the Federal
Arbitration Act.97  The FAA will still apply to employment, consumer
and civil right disputes—nothing within the Act changes this position.
93. Id. § 2(2).
94. See id. § (2)3.
95. Id. § 2(1).
96. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong., § 2(7) (2009).
Many corporations add to their arbitration clauses unfair provisions that
deliberately tilt the systems against individuals, including provisions
that strip individuals of substantive statutory rights, ban class actions,
and force people to arbitrate their claims hundreds of miles from their
homes.  While some courts have been protective of individuals, too many
courts have upheld even egregiously unfair mandatory arbitration
clauses in deference to a supposed federal policy favoring arbitration
over the constitutional rights of individuals.
Id.
97. This is true, except maybe the removal of the term “seamen” from section 1. See
H.R. 1873, 112th Cong., § 402(b)(1)(a) (2011).
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Consequently, this language will do nothing to reign in the coverage of
the FAA.
Moreover, the disparity between the parties within various types of
contracts of adhesion is highlighted on several occasions within this
relatively brief Act.  In fact, one could argue it is one of the driving
forces behind Congress’s belief in its need to reign in the scope of the
FAA.  Congress emphasizes the impact of the disparity when it writes:
“Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful choice
whether to submit their claims to arbitration.  Often, consumers and
employees are not even aware that they have given up their rights.”98
Based on this line of reasoning, Congress suggests that these particu-
lar groups should be given additional protections because they are the
weaker parties in the contractual relationship who do not fully appre-
ciate the nature of the choice between arbitration and litigation and
are given no real choice between the two.  This is clearly one of the
laudable goals of the AFA as the Act attempts to ensure that weaker
parties are provided a “true choice.”  However, Congress has failed to
distinguish arbitration clauses within contracts of adhesion from run
of the mill contracts of adhesion that consumers enter into every
day.99  Moreover, even assuming that distinguishing characteristics
can be found between all clauses within contracts of adhesion and ar-
bitration clauses within contracts of adhesion, Congress’s method of
reducing this power imbalance must be viewed with intense skepti-
cism.  In an effort to remedy this power disparity, Congress requires
that consent to arbitration must “occur(s) after the dispute arises.”
Congress does not explain how, exactly, the voluntary nature of arbi-
tration is better ensured by requiring consent after the dispute
98. H.R. 1873, 112th Cong., § 2(3) (2011).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981) states:
Weakness in the bargaining process.  A bargain is not unconscionable
merely because the parties to it are unequal in bargaining position, nor
even because the inequality results in an allocation of risks to the
weaker party.  But gross inequality of bargaining power, together with
terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party, may confirm indica-
tions that the transaction involved elements of deception or compulsion,
or may show that the weaker party had no meaningful choice, no real
alternative, or did not in fact assent or appear to assent to the unfair
terms.  Factors which may contribute to a finding of unconscionability in
the bargaining process include the following: belief by the stronger party
that there is no reasonable probability that the weaker party will fully
perform the contract; knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker
party will be unable to receive substantial benefits from the contract;
knowledge of the stronger party that the weaker party is unable reason-
ably to protect his interests by reason of physical or mental infirmities,
ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of the agree-
ment, or similar factors.
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arises,100 when the dispute remains between the same people of une-
qual bargaining power.  Moreover, it is not a stretch to argue that an
employee in a dispute with his employer is in a far weaker position to
now insist on the use of a court over arbitration.  Clearly, this goal—
while a noble one—is not accomplished by this provision within the
Act.
Finally, one has to wonder if the real intent of the Act is hidden,
not so subtly, in direct statements that capture common criticism of
the nature of arbitration itself, the confidential nature of arbitration,
and the lack of substantive review.  While at first blush these may
appear to be reasonable complaints, the hidden agenda is actually do-
ing nothing more than reinvigorating the old bias that stood behind
the need for the FAA in the first place.  It is this argument that is
most concerning and may just be a window to bias behind the Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act of 2011.
As Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy expressed in a state-
ment: “In arbitration, there is no transparency, nor is there an inde-
pendent arbitrator.”101  Congress has also expressed a similar
concern, stating: “Mandatory arbitration undermines the development
of public law because there is inadequate transparency and inade-
quate judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions.”102  There is little ambi-
guity in these statements; arbitration lacks transparency and
arbitrators lack independence.  One could infer from these statements
that arbitration is not to be trusted.  The “lack of trust” sentiment
runs throughout prior versions of the Act.  For example, the 2009 ver-
sion of the Act emphasizes the lack of trust sentiment by stating:
“With the knowledge that their rulings will not be seriously examined
by a court applying current law, arbitrators enjoy near complete free-
dom to ignore the law and even their own rules.”103  And “[w]hile the
American civil justice system features publicly accountable decision
makers who generally issue written decisions that are widely availa-
ble to the public, arbitration offers none of these features.”104
With no real research or actual concrete evidence and with emo-
tional pleas based in personal horror stories and sensationalism, Con-
gress has not hidden its lack of understanding and its bias against
arbitration, despite the absence of proper research and concrete evi-
100. Cf. Lisa Blomgren Bingham & David Henning Good, A Better Solution to Moral
Hazard in Employment Arbitration: It is Time to Ban Pre-dispute Arbitration
Clauses, 93 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 1–14 (2009).
101. Coyle, supra note 59.
102. H.R. 1873, 112th Cong., § 4 (2011).  This is something that I have myself argued.
See Anjanette H. Raymond, Confidentiality in a Forum of Last Resort: Is the Use
of Confidential Arbitration a Good Idea for Business and Society?, 16 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 479 (2005).
103. H.R. 1020, 111th Cong., § 2(5) (2009).
104. Id. § 2(6) (2009).
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dence and an abundance of sensational, emotional pleas permeating
this debate.  And statements such as: “Arbitration can be an accept-
able alternative”105 cannot mask the political reaction that energizes
the ongoing propagation of the bias against arbitration.
Examining one of the main biases, the lack of transparency,
reveals a shocking set of statistics—not in terms of arbitration but in
terms of the judicial system as a whole.  For example, the number of
civil trials that actually end up being resolved by a judge or a jury is
remarkably low.  According to the National Center for State
Courts,106 in 2002 Texas had 164,837107 civil cases108 that were dis-
posed of during the calendar year.  Of those cases that reached a dis-
position, 1% were disposed of by a jury trial, 14.5% by a non-jury
trial,109 14% by default, 43% settled or were dismissed,110 and 27%
fell within the catch-all “other.”111  The 2003 report also highlights
that, looking at a composite of twenty-one unified and general juris-
diction state courts, “about 8 percent of civil cases were disposed of by
trial in these 21 States.  The greatest proportion of civil cases (42 per-
cent) were settled and/or dismissed by the court.”112  According to the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, of the 282,895 civil cases
filed in U.S. District Courts for 2010, only slightly above 1% (3,309)
proceeded to trial.113  Removing consideration of the obviously con-
cerning fact that a larger percentage of cases are disposed of through
default or dismissal, one cannot help but appreciate the growing use of
settlement as a legitimate means of resolving disputes.  While this
may in fact be a good thing, it is clear that a large percentage of court
cases do not become part of the public record as settlements generally
go unreported.  Hence, arbitration is not the only dispute resolution
mechanism that fails to produce full transparency.
Moreover, in relation to a second closely tied criticism, the use of
arbitration erodes common law and the need for transparency as arbi-
tration awards generally remain confidential and unpublished.  This
105. H.R. 1873, 112th Cong., § 2(5) (2011).
106. Information about the organization available at: http://www.ncsc.org/.
107. See Examining the Work of State Courts, 2003, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE






113. U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending, UNITED
STATES COURTS, Table 4.1, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicial
FactsAndFigures/2010/Table401.pdf; U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Termi-
nated, by Action Taken, UNITED STATES COURTS, Table 4.10, http://www.us
courts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2010/Table410.pdf.  Fur-
ther general information is available at: http://www.uscourts.gov/Home.aspx.
2013] IT IS TIME THE LAW PROTECTS CONSUMERS 689
is in fact not so unlike a large percentage of court cases since the late
1970s.  In fact, according to Stephen L. Wasby:
“Unpublished” rulings, denominated “memorandum dispositions” . . . are
now used in upwards of three-fourths of all cases in the U.S. courts of ap-
peals . . . .  By 1987, the proportion of all courts of appeals dispositive judg-
ments resulting in published opinions had dropped to thirty-eight percent,
and it declined further by 1993 to just over one-fourth, the level at which it
remained in 1998.  In short, unpublished dispositions, rather than being a
rare event, are quite common; so routine is their use that we find them even in
some death penalty habeas cases and requests for stays of execution, even
when a judge dissents.114
Today, all eleven circuit courts of appeal limit the publication of
opinions, usually basing the decision on determinations related to the
cases’ precedential value.115  This does not, however, mean cases can-
not be found, as some decisions are still published with a notation and
of course all courts retain copies of the records of the case.  However,
these opinions remain a matter of the unpublished court record and
are therefore more difficult to discover and review.  This is slightly
different than arbitration opinions, which may or may not be pub-
lished without key details of the parties involved and are substantially
different from arbitration decisions that remain shrouded under a
shield of confidentiality.  However, pretending that the judicial system
is under constant review and contains published decisions is wishful
thinking.
Finally, arbitration is not the only means of dispute resolution that
allows parties to protect the existence of the dispute and the proceed-
ings and the outcome of those proceedings behind a veil of party-
crafted confidentiality.  Oftentimes parties bargain for and include a
confidentiality agreement within their settlement.116  And the above
judicial statistics reveal that many cases are resolved through a set-
tlement mechanism.  It is certainly not a stretch to imagine that a
good portion of these contain confidentiality clauses.  While in recent
times there has been a growing backlash against the use of confidenti-
114. Stephen L.Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at the
Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 69–70 (2004) (citing Charm v. Mullin, 37 F.
App’x 475 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing an affirmance of denial of habeas in a capi-
tal case that resulted in an authored opinion of eight printed pages containing
not only factual matters but legal analysis); Byrd v. Bagley, 37 F. App’x 94 (6th
Cir. 2002); Robinson v. Gibson, 35 F. App’x 715 (10th Cir. 2002); JUDITH A. MCK-
ENNA ET AL., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
18, 21 (Federal Judicial Center 2000)).
115. Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Gov-
erning Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 251,
253–55 (2001).
116. For an examination of the use of settlements and concerns arising from their
growing use, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1983–84)
(arguing that settlements are often in the interest of efficiency and not necessa-
rily in the interest of justice).
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ality agreements in relation to some types of employment settle-
ments,117 these stand as the exception, not the norm.  Asserting that
arbitration is the only dispute resolution mechanism that shields it-
self in party created confidentiality is simply wrong.
Consequently, the argument that transparency of outcomes should
be a concern for all dispute resolution mechanisms is persuasive.
However, the argument that arbitration lacks transparency to a
larger extent than the judicial system is clearly false.  A very large
percentage of judicial cases end up being dismissed or settled with the
outcome not being reported either through the use of a confidentiality
agreement in the settlement or the production of an “unpublished”
opinion.  Arbitration is not alone in suffering from these tactics.
In terms of the third main criticism, that arbitration awards lack
review and the system lacks judicial oversight, this belief is the prod-
uct of misunderstanding of the law.  Arbitration awards are generally
not subject to the right of appeal as are judicial awards; however, arbi-
tration awards are subject to review concerning procedural irregular-
ity.  In the United States, the confirmation, recognition, and
enforcement of both domestic and foreign arbitral awards is governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act as long as the award arises within the
broad coverage of the Act.  For the most part, this requires that the
subject matter of the dispute somehow involves “commerce,” which in
the United States means tangentially connected to the Commerce
Clause.118  So even areas that one would expect to not be covered by
the FAA, such as employment contracts, are in fact covered by the
Act.119  In the case that state law applies, the Uniform Arbitration Act
117. For example, in several cases in relation to the Fair Labor Standards Act, see
Stalnaker v. Novar Corp., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Ala. 2003), Scott v. Memory
Co., LLC, No. 3:09cv290-SRW, 2010 WL 4683621 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 10, 2010), and
Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1242 (M.D. Fla. 2010); and in rela-
tion to employment discrimination, see EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., 94 F.3d 738 (1st
Cir. 1996); Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363 (D. Nev. 1993).
118. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967),
the Supreme Court examined the legislative history of the Act and concluded that
the statute “is based upon . . . the incontestable federal foundations of ‘control
over interstate commerce and over admiralty.’” Id. at 405 (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
68-96, at 1 (1924)).  This was followed by Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 n.32 (1983), in which the Supreme
Court “reaffirmed our view that the Arbitration Act ‘creates a body of federal
substantive law’ and expressly stated what was implicit in Prima Paint, i.e., the
substantive law the Act created was applicable in state and federal courts.”
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 941 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26).
119. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (“The FAA’s coverage
provision, § 2, compels judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements ‘in
any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”).  In Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995), the Court interpreted § 2’s
“involving commerce” phrase as implementing Congress’s “intent to exercise [its]
commerce power to the full.”
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(UAA) provides the appropriate guidance as the UAA has been widely
adopted among the states.120  Despite this potential division in the
law, in most instances—such as those at issue in this Article—the dis-
tinctions between state law and federal law will be minimal.
Generally, arbitration awards that fall within the FAA or the UAA
can be resisted or challenged if the award lacks basic due process pro-
tection, such as lack of an arbitration agreement, lack of notice, arbi-
trators that lack independence or impartiality, arbitrators that exceed
their power, or an award that is the product of corruption, fraud, or
undue means.121  In fact, in the United States in some limited in-
stances it is possible to challenge or resist confirmation, recognition,
or enforcement of an arbitration award if the arbitrators have “mani-
festly disregarded the law.”122  Moreover, it is arguable that in the
United States the courts “still serve as ‘gatekeepers’123 to make deter-
minations relating to the arbitration agreement itself.”124  In general,
courts are still called upon to determine (1) questions regarding the
existence or validity of an arbitration agreement, and (2) questions
about whether or not a particular dispute falls within the scope of an
arbitration provision.125  Clearly, when it comes to enforcing the arbi-
tration agreement and the award, courts have the last word in terms
of enforcement, and this by necessity involves some oversight of the
arbitration process and the subsequent award to ensure that basic
ideas of due process are protected.  Again, Congress seeks to seize
upon a bias that reflects a basic misunderstanding of arbitration.
These biases cannot be allowed to hamper the main goal: the protec-
120. See REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000).  Arguments have been made the Uni-
form Arbitration Act is one of the most successful Uniform Laws as it was
adopted by forty-nine states and widely influenced the one state that did not
adopt the Act (New York).  New York State Bar Association, Report on the Re-
vised Uniform Arbitration Act, 1 (Dec. 9, 2005), http://www.nysba.org/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=
54109.
121. Although it is rare for the recognizing or enforcing court to find instances of pro-
cedural irregularities, this should be viewed as a testament to the procedurally
sound nature of the system of arbitration and not a lack of review.
122. See generally Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law
Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL.
117 (1998); Thomas V. Burch, Manifest Disregard and the Imperfect Procedural
Justice of Arbitration, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 47 (2010); Elizabeth A. Roma,
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts and the Need for Mean-
ingful Judicial Review, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 519 (2004).
123. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy, supra note 34, at 10 (citing Rent-A-
Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); Gary B. Born, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION 955–58 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1919936).
124. See Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy, supra note 34, at 27.
125. See id.
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tion of weaker parties from contracts of adhesion that contain signifi-
cantly one-sided arbitration clauses.
E. What Is Being Done?
Congress is not the only institution looking at arbitration.  The
American Law Institute is in the process of drafting the Restatement
(Third) of U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration.126  As
the title suggests, the purpose of this project is to examine law in rela-
tion to international commercial law.  This limits the examination of
unconscionability, but does not eliminate it from the drafters’ contem-
plation.  Instead, it places consideration of the doctrine of unconscio-
nability within the ambit of the New York Convention and
international law.127  Within international arbitration law, there is a
general belief that arbitration awards that are the product of a con-
tractual relationship that has been significantly tainted by “fraud, du-
ress, impossibility and unconscionability” lack validity and will,
hence, be unenforceable.128  However, to date, few courts have taken
up this issue at any length.129
States continue to work on state-directed arbitration law, as well.
For example, in 2000 the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws drafted the most recent version of the Uniform
126. For more information, visit http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj
_ip&projectid=20.  In 2009, George Bermann wrote about the potential problems
behind the Second Restatement. See George Bermann, Restating the U.S. Law of
International Commercial Arbitration, 42 U.S. L. INT’L COM. ARB. 175 (2009).
127. One should note, jurisdictions have various means of handling issues in relation
to the use of standard form contracts and the doctrine of unconscionability.  For
example, England handles this type of regulation within the EC Directive on Un-
fair Terms in Consumer Contracts and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
Regulation (1994). See 1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS 995 (A.G. Guest et al., eds., 25th
ed. 2008).
128. For example, the Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of International Commer-
cial Arbitration § 5-8 cmts. a & b, clarify that an arbitration agreement may be
invalid because it was executed by a person who lacked capacity, either actual or
apparent authority, or because of fraud, duress, impossibility, or unconscionabil-
ity.  As the Restatement notes, a court may deny recognition or enforcement of a
convention award to the extent that “no arbitration agreement exists or the arbi-
tration agreement is invalid.” See id. § 5-8(a). But see id. § 5-6(c) (noting that
even if some ground for denying enforcement exists, the court may, in exceptional
circumstances, enforce the award).  However, notice this issue has arisen in the
recognition and enforcement area which places the question under the New York
Convention. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395, 406–07 (1967) (holding that “[s]ince the claim of fraud here relates to induce-
ment of the consulting agreement generally, rather than in the arbitration
clause, and there is no evidence that the parties intended to withhold this issue
from arbitration, there is no basis for granting a stay under § 3”).
129. This may leave an interesting disparity between domestic-based arbitration
agreements and awards and the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards.
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Arbitration Act.130  This Act has historically been widely successful;
the previous version had forty-nine state adoptions and the current
version already has fifteen enactments, with three states recently in-
troducing the Act for adoption.131  While the Act does specifically
cover the basics of enforceability in the face of an arbitration
clause,132 the Drafting Committee decided to leave the issue of adhe-
sion contracts and unconscionability to developing law.  The decision
was made because:
(1) the doctrine of unconscionability reflects so much the substantive law of
the States and not just arbitration, (2) the case law, statutes, and arbitration
standards are rapidly changing, and (3) treating arbitration clauses differ-
ently from other contract provisions would raise significant preemption issues
under the Federal Arbitration Act.133
In hindsight, this was probably a brilliant decision as the outcome of
the AT&T Mobility (2011)134 case has closed or at least clouded the
issue.
The arbitration community has also taken note of ongoing concerns
relating to contracts of adhesion, weaker parties, and their right to
due process.  For example, the two largest U.S. arbitration institu-
tions, the American Arbitration Association and JAMS, have both
promulgated due process protocols to regulate the fairness of con-
sumer and employment arbitration agreements.135  One common criti-
cism when an industry self-regulates is the lack of enforceability of
130. Arbitration Act 2000, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION (2012), http://uniformlaws.org/
Act.aspx?title=Arbitration Act (2000).
131. Id.
132. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act, UNIFORMLAWS.ORG, § 6(a), at 18 (Dec. 13, 2000), http://www.uniform
laws.org/shared/docs/arbitration/arbitration_final_00.pdf.  The Act further states:
“Validity of Agreement to Arbitrate: An agreement contained in a record to sub-
mit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the
parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a
ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.” Id.  This
language tracks both the previous version of the UAA (1956) and the Federal
Arbitration Act.
133. Id. § 6 cmt. 7, at 23–26.  There is also an excellent review of the various then-
existing state court cases in relation to the issue of unconscionability. See id.
134. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011).
135. For example, the JAMS rule on the Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness
states: “If an arbitration is based on a clause or agreement that is required as a
condition of employment, JAMS will accept the assignment only if the proceeding
complies with the ‘Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness for Employment
Arbitration.’” JAMS Policy on Employment Arbitration, JAMS (July 15, 2009),
http://www.jamsadr.com/employment-minimum-standards/.  The JAMS rules in-
tend to include these minimum standards: Standard No. 1: All remedies availa-
ble, Standard No. 2: Arbitrator Neutrality, Standard No. 3: Representation by
Counsel, Standard No. 4: Access to Information/Discovery, Standard No. 5: Pres-
entation of Evidence, Standard No. 6: Costs and Location Must Not Preclude Ac-
cess to Arbitration, Standard No. 7: Mutuality, Standard No. 8: Written Awards.
Id.  The rules go on to specify:
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any self-determined protocols.136  This criticism is compounded con-
cerning arbitration because the vast majority of awards remain
shielded behind confidentiality agreements.  However, this criticism
should be rejected in these two particular institutional instances.  A
recent study by Christopher R. Drahozal and Samantha Zyontz titled
Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration137 has found that in prac-
tice arbitration institutions are in fact supporting the plight of con-
sumers or employees in arbitration who lack basic due process
protections.138  Their real world research has an incredibly positive
outcome:
We find that the AAA’s review of arbitration clauses for protocol compliance
appears to be effective at identifying and responding to those clauses with
protocol violations.  During the time period studied, the AAA refused to ad-
minister a substantial number of cases (almost 10% of its total consumer
caseload) that involved a protocol violation.  Moreover, in response to AAA
protocol compliance review, over 150 businesses have either waived problem-
atic provisions or revised arbitration clauses to remove provisions that vio-
lated the Consumer Due Process Protocol.139
The study goes on to reiterate a point made by many scholars: “We do
not assert that private regulation alone—with no public regulatory
backstop, such as through court oversight—suffices to ensure the fair-
ness of consumer arbitration proceedings.”140
As can be seen from the study, at least some of the criticism of
arbitration is misplaced as the industry itself recognizes the need to
police due process protections at a better level.  However, these at-
tempts by the arbitration industry, while noble, have done little to
If JAMS becomes aware that an arbitration clause or procedure does not
comply with the Minimum Standards, it will notify the employer of the
Minimum Standards and inform the employer that the arbitration de-
mand will not be accepted unless there is full compliance with those
standards.  In assessing whether the standards are met and whether to
accept the arbitration assignment, JAMS, as the ADR provider, will
limit its inquiry to a facial review of the clause or procedure.  If a factual
inquiry is required, for example, to determine compliance with Minimum
Standards, it must be conducted by an arbitrator or court.
Id.
136. Unfortunately, the only option for JAMS and AAA is to make these provisions
suggestive.  If the provisions took on a mandatory nature (i.e., the parties could
not submit their dispute to JAMS if they failed to meet the standard) the parties
would be left in a difficult position, with an arbitration clause in their contract
that might be pathological as the dispute could not be initiated at the institution
within the clause.  These type of situations place courts and arbitration institu-
tions in a difficult position as the court will assist the parties in setting up arbi-
tration, but will rarely overlook the parties’ intent to arbitrate.
137. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration (Univ. of Kan. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2011–4, Aug. 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1904545.
138. Id. at 1.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 1–2.
2013] IT IS TIME THE LAW PROTECTS CONSUMERS 695
quash public concerns about arbitration clauses within contracts of
adhesion.  As we have seen, the AT&T Mobility case has brought to a
head concern about overlapping areas of consumers, contracts of adhe-
sion, and arbitration.  Numerous entities, including a section of Con-
gress, the legal community, academics, and arbitration institutions
have heard the call and are attempting to define these overlapping
areas in various ways.  However, one essential set of questions re-
main: who should be protected, what should they be protected from,
and how will those protections be accomplished?  The next sections
seek to respond to these questions.
III. SOLUTIONS
Contracts of adhesion, especially those involving consumers and
the purchase of basic goods, are ubiquitous in modern commercial life.
Moreover, they are often heralded as positive for business and con-
sumers as contracts of adhesion can lead to lower transactions
costs141 and a predictable business legal environment.  Certainly, it is
a bit late to put the cat back into the bag, at least in terms of contracts
of adhesion.  But that really should not be the end of the debate as the
real issue is not contracts of adhesion but a particular term or clause
contained in a contract of adhesion, especially when terms within the
clause are designed to significantly benefit the business drafters.  As
such, we are left with a series of incredibly timely questions: who
should be protected, from what, and how?
Consider the following example.  On Sept. 19, 2011, Sony Network
Entertainment International142 decided to “update” its terms of ser-
vice to include the following clause:
ANY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEEDINGS, WHETHER IN ARBITRA-
TION OR COURT, WILL BE CONDUCTED ONLY ON AN INDIVIDUAL
BASIS AND NOT IN A CLASS OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTION OR AS A
NAMED OR UNNAMED MEMBER IN A CLASS, CONSOLIDATED, REP-
RESENTATIVE OR PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL ACTION, UNLESS
141. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1001 (1996).
142. Tons of websites, blogs and newspapers immediately responded with criticism
with this change. See, e.g., Mark Milian, Sony: Supreme Court ruling spurred
changes to PlayStation terms, CNN (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/
21/tech/gaming-gadgets/sony-psn-terms/index.html  (considering the Sony
change of Terms of Service in light of the AT&T Mobility decision); Jose Vilches,
Sony changes PSN terms to block class action lawsuits, TECHSPOT (Sept. 16,
2011), http://www.techspot.com/news/45505-sony-changes-psn-terms-to-block-
class-action-lawsuits-.html; Hamish Barwick, Sony PSN Australia customers
spared service changes: Gamers in North America asked to agree to new terms of
service before signing into network, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.
computerworld.com.au/article/401352/sony_psn_australia_customers_spared_
service_changes/#closeme (noting that Australians will not be asked to agree to
such a clause).
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BOTH YOU AND THE SONY ENTITY WITH WHICH YOU HAVE A DIS-
PUTE SPECIFICALLY AGREE TO DO SO IN WRITING FOLLOWING INI-
TIATION OF THE ARBITRATION.  THIS PROVISION DOES NOT
PRECLUDE YOUR PARTICIPATION AS A MEMBER IN A CLASS ACTION
FILED ON OR BEFORE AUGUST 20, 2011.143
As the AT&T Mobility case made clear, this clause is perfectly le-
gal.144  But one has to wonder: is it really ok to update terms of service
this way for an expensive product I already own?145  Sony Network
Entertainment Inc. clearly states that you can opt out of the clause
simply by mailing a letter within thirty days of receipt of the change
in terms of service.  Alternatively, you can always cancel your Sony
Entertainment account.  While it might seem a bit unfair that this
143. Terms of Service and User Agreement, SONY ENTERTAINMENT NETWORK (Version
13, Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.sonyentertainmentnetwork.com/tosua.
144. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753–54 (2011).  One should
note Sony’s clause is actually not that bad in terms of the imposition it places on
consumers.  It does not proscribe a location of hearing, or jurisdiction, nor does it
proscribe a difficult and obtuse means of initiating arbitration.  Most impor-
tantly, it does allow customers to opt out.  Of course, no one will but that really is
not Sony’s fault, is it?  In fact, Sony actually sent an email to all PlayStation
Network members, thus, the criticism that it was a “stealth clause insertion” is a
bit overblown.
145. Currently, the answer is probably “yes” at least in the manner that Sony facili-
tated the change.  First, according to Douglas v. Talk America, 495 F.3d 1062,
1066 (9th Cir. 2007), the California court made clear, when considering an online
change to the terms of service:
[A] party can’t unilaterally change the terms of a contract; it must obtain
the other party’s consent before doing so. Union Pac. R.R. v. Chi., Mil-
waukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 114, 118 (9th Cir. 1976).  This is
because a revised contract is merely an offer and does not bind the par-
ties until it is accepted. Matanuska Valley Farmers Cooperating Ass’n v.
Monaghan, 188 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1951).  And generally “an offeree
cannot actually assent to an offer unless he knows of its existence.”  1
Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts
§ 4:13, at 365 (4th ed. 1990); see also Trimble v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 255
N.Y.S. 292, 297 (App. Div. 1932) (“An offer may not be accepted until it is
made and brought to the attention of the one accepting.”).  Even if Doug-
las’s continued use of Talk America’s service could be considered assent,
such assent can only be inferred after he received proper notice of the
proposed changes.
However, the language and attention drawn to the notice is also important. See,
e.g., DIRECTV v. Mattingly, 829 A.2d 626, 636–37 (Md. 2003) (observing that
“proper notice” requires that the customer receive “enough information to make
an informed decision”); see also Briceno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176,
180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the consumer must be given “a fair and
clear warning of changes”); Badie v. Bank of Am., 67 Cal. App. 4th 779, 805
(1998) (explaining that notice must be designed to achieve “knowing consent”).
Consequently, at least under several state laws, notice must be given in an online
relationship when one of the parties intends to change the terms of service and
the notice must draw attention to the change and be written in a clear manner.
In this case, Sony provided notice, called attention to the changes, used clear
language, and allowed the parties to “opt out” of the changes.  As such, this
change of terms of service is most likely enforceable.
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clause can be inserted so long after a customer has purchased her en-
tertainment system, businesses must be allowed to update terms of
service.146  Thus the real questions must involve the determination of
who should be protected, from what, and how will the law protect
them.  The simple answers are that not all contracts of adhesion are
bad, not all parties should be protected, and only in a limited set of
circumstances should we be worried about arbitration clauses.
A. Are All Parties Facing Arbitration Clauses in Contracts
of Adhesion Created Equal?
The simple response is that all parties facing arbitration clauses in
contracts of adhesion are not in fact created equal.  Some parties in
contracts of adhesion have already been segregated out to be awarded
special protections.  Under the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Ar-
bitration Fairness Act,147 enacted in 2002, arbitration provisions in
motor vehicle franchise agreements are enforceable “to resolve a con-
troversy arising out of or relating to such contract . . . only if after such
controversy arises all parties to such controversy consent in writing to
use arbitration to settle such controversy.”148  Some of the rationale
behind the protections afforded motor vehicle franchisees:
Dealers of new motor vehicles are virtual economic captives of automobile
manufacturers.  Unlike some other franchisees, who may have a broad choice
of franchisers with which to contract, new motor vehicle dealers may only ob-
tain the right to merchandise and sell their product from an extremely limited
group of manufacturers.  As a result of the imbalance in bargaining power
inherent in this relationship, manufacturers possess unparalleled leverage
over dealers and potential franchisees.  Motor vehicle manufacturers have
historically, and do currently, require dealers to execute standard contracts of
adhesion defining the manufacturer-dealer contract on a “take it or leave it”
basis.149
This language in many ways mirrors the language and overall ap-
proach of the language used in the recent Arbitration Fairness Act
146. In fact, Sony made the argument that the insertion of an anti-class-action arbi-
tration clause is not bad.  Sony argued in response to a CNN request for a re-
sponse: “The updated language in the TOS is designed to benefit both the
consumer and the company by ensuring that there is adequate time and proce-
dures to resolve disputes.”  Mark Milian, Sony: Supreme Court ruling spurred
changes to PlayStation terms, CNN (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/
21/tech/gaming-gadgets/sony-psn-terms/index.html.
147. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1226 (2002).  Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
state legislatures are constitutionally empowered to regulate the motor vehicle
contractual relationship as a valid exercise of their police powers.  See New Motor
Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2).
149. The Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, S. REP. NO. 107-
266, 107th Cong., § IV (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter Motor Vehicle, Senate Report
(2002)], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-107srpt266/html/CRPT-
107srpt266.htm.
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(AFA).  Clearly, Congress has already recognized the need to protect
some categories of parties that stand in significantly weaker bargain-
ing positions.  But one has to ask: why should automobile franchisees
benefit from protections unavailable to the average consumer placed
in a similar position?
The distinguishing facts paint an interesting picture of the funda-
mental distinctions between certain types of franchisees and the aver-
age consumer.  It is important to note that the Federal Arbitration
Act, prior to the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract
Arbitration Fairness Act, applied to these types of contracts in the
same manner as all commercial/commerce-based arbitration con-
tracts.150  As such, had Congress not acted to protect these specific
parties, the AT&T Mobility151 case would have solidified the position
of federal preemption in relation to arbitration clauses within
franchise agreements.152  Instead, Congress acted for some very spe-
cific and enlightened reasons.  First, to create an agency designed spe-
cifically to enforce motor vehicle franchise laws and charged with
enforcing public policy protections:
These State forums, boards, and commissions serve as efficient and cost-effec-
tive alternative dispute resolution systems for motor vehicle franchise dis-
putes because State agencies have both expertise and experience in these
matters.  State motor vehicle administrative forums were specifically estab-
lished for the public policy purpose of providing alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, but with the added features of important legal safeguards, par-
ticularly that of a right to appeal.153
Congress, yet again, let its bias toward certain aspects of arbitra-
tion show, but in this context it seems to be accepted.  Why?  Probably
150. There was widespread use of mandatory binding arbitration in dealer franchise
contracts.  According to the Motor Vehicle, Senate Report (2002), dealers such as:
Bering Truck, DaimlerChrysler (which provided limited opt-out of arbitration by
addendum), Freightliner Truck/DaimlerChrysler, Sterling Truck/Daimler-
Chrysler, Ferrari, Ford Dealer Development—principally with dealer develop-
ment programs, General Motors Dealer Development—principally with dealer
development programs, Saturn/GM, Hino Diesel—Toyota majority stock holder,
Kenworth Truck, Nissan Diesel, Peterbilt Trucks, Suzuki, and Western Star, all
used this type of arbitration agreement. See id. at 3.
151. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
152. Of course, Congress was most likely reacting to a series of cases that seemed to
cause great issue in terms of statutory rights available under the Sherman Act.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614
(1985), followed by Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990)
(relying upon Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483 (1987)).
153. Motor Vehicle, Senate Report (2002), supra note 149, at section V (listing the
states of: “Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin”).
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for several reasons: (1) the industry itself has several well-recognized
and efficient alternative dispute resolution organizations,154 (2)
mandatory arbitration clauses are often designed to get around other-
wise applicable state laws and state-created forums, (3) “motor vehicle
dealer(s), after making a tremendous investment, depend completely
upon the manufacturer to survive and prosper,”155 and (4) “[m]otor
vehicle franchise contracts and resulting disputes greatly affect the
competitive distribution of vehicles which directly affects consumers
as well as individual States’ economies generally.”156
Congress has advanced these types of justifications before for other
similarly situated parties.  For example, the Petroleum Marketing
Practices Act,157 which regulates franchise relationship between oil
refineries and gasoline retailers, was enacted to “prevent oil compa-
nies from improperly exploiting their unequal bargaining power and
to deter unfair conduct by prohibiting refineries from forcing gasoline
retailers to accept mandatory binding arbitration and surrendering
important statutory rights.”158  Clearly, Congress stands ready and
willing to assist in the protection of significantly weaker parties when
faced with contracts of adhesion containing arbitration clauses.  But it
seems those protections will only be afforded in an incredibly narrow
set of circumstances under which the lack of available protections may
impact the economic well-being of a large section of the population.
Should consumers be treated the same and afforded the same protec-
tions as those parties already protected?  And if so, how broad should
those protections be from arbitration clauses?
B. What Protections Are Really Necessary and for Whom?
Freedom of contract enables enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is
even more important, to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner
without using the appearance of authoritarian forms.  Standard contracts in
particular could thus become effective instruments in the hands of powerful
154. The Supreme Court has previously upheld a mandatory arbitration clause in Gil-
mer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30–33 (1991), at least par-
tially because the Court found that enough safeguards exist because the private
New York Stock Exchange arbitration rules protected against bias, allowed for
adequate discovery, required arbitrators to provide awards in writing, and did
not limit the available relief.
155. Motor Vehicle, Senate Report (2002), supra note 149, at section IV.
156. Id.  “In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that State legislatures are consti-
tutionally empowered to regulate the motor vehicle contractual relationship as a
valid exercise of their police powers.” Id. (citing New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin
W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978)).
157. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2806 (2012).
158. Motor Vehicle, Senate Report (2002), supra note 149, at section V (citing Petro-
leum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2806 (2012)).
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industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal
order of their own making upon a vast host of vassals.159
Friedrich Kessler made this alarming prediction based on several
key observations in terms of contracts of adhesion and freedoms of
contract.  Kessler argued that “[t]he stereotyped [standardized] con-
tract of today reflects the impersonality of the market.”160  One should
not forget, however, that “society as a whole ultimately benefits from
the use of standard contracts.”161  Of course, as argued by many schol-
ars including Kessler, business benefits when it can create uniform
terms to cover similar situations, allowing them to anticipate and con-
glomerate risk in a predictable fashion.  When business is allowed to
engage in this activity, the entire market community realizes cost
benefits.
Unfortunately, some businesses began to recognize benefits of an-
other kind and began to use this recognition to their advantage.  To-
day the majority of scholars appreciate that:
Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong bargaining
power.  The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in
a position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the
standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all compet-
159. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943), available at http://digitalcommons.
law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2731.  The issue of standard form contracts has intrigued
scholars for many years. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Con-
tracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002); M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscio-
nability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths
About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1 (1981); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Arthur Allen
Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law Tradi-
tion, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1970); Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Con-
tracts Between Merchants, 40 SW. L.J. 1065 (1986); John E. Murray, Jr.,
Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1969); Randy E. Bar-
nett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002); Todd D.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173
(1983); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971);   John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyz-
ing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969); Richard E. Spei-
del, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359
(1970).
160. Kessler, supra note 159, at 631.
161. Id. at 632.  However, as Thomas J. Stipanowich argued:
Broad judicial enforcement of arbitration provisions in standardized ad-
hesion contracts governing employees and consumers has fueled impas-
sioned debate over the need for regulation of arbitration agreements.
The real concerns of reform advocates, lawmakers, legal commentators,
and educators have produced strong responses that “spill over” into the
realm of arm’s-length business-to-business agreements—often imposing
new transaction costs without commensurate benefits.
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
1 (2010).
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itors use the same clauses.  His contractual intention is but a subjection more
or less voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose conse-
quences are often understood only in a vague way, if at all . . . .  Not infre-
quently the weaker party to a prospective contract even agrees in advance not
to retract his offer while the offeree reserves for himself the power to accept or
refuse; or he submits to terms or change of terms which will be communicated
to him later.162
Kessler is intimating that contracts of adhesion have become so ubiq-
uitous and have shifted the balance of power so significantly in favor
of business that in some instances courts and legislative bodies need
to be concerned about what clauses and terms are contained within a
contract.  Kessler is asking us to consider two key points: the ubiqui-
tous nature of contracts of adhesion and the disadvantage created by
the power imbalance.  In our current case, the issue that must be
given prominence is the power imbalance between the parties as the
ubiquitous nature of contracts of adhesion in consumer and employee
contracts is a matter for another day.  In this instance, and in line
with Kessler’s argument, we should cast an eye on arbitration clauses
within contracts of adhesion that take advantage of the power imbal-
ance.163  Thus, when considering the scope and protections afforded to
weaker parties, we should focus on arbitration clauses within con-
tracts of adhesion in which the party in the stronger bargaining posi-
tion seeks to take significant advantage of its position.
C. How Should Those Protections Be Accomplished?
In light of case law coming out of the Supreme Court, the preemp-
tive status of the FAA and the public’s growing concern over the inser-
tion of arbitration clauses within contracts of adhesion, Congress
needs to act.  So why is there not widespread support for the Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act?  I would suggest a main reason is that the AFA, as
162. Kessler, supra note 159, at 632.
163. Of course, this is a return to the essence of the issue that underlies concerns
surrounding contracts of adhesions, the “gross inequality of bargaining power,
together with terms unreasonably favorable to the stronger party.” RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT OR TERM § 208 cmt. d
(1981).  And handling unconscionable clauses is a power left to the courts wide
discretion.  For example, under the Restatement (Second) Of Contracts: “If a con-
tract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any uncon-
scionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.” Id. § 208.  A similar ap-
proach is taken under the Uniform Commercial Code:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the appli-
cation of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2003).
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currently written, seems to focus too much on old biases against arbi-
tration instead of focusing on the specific and narrow area of concern.
The lack of support might be overcome if the Act focused on protecting
a narrow class of individuals needing protection from a contract of ad-
hesion that contains an arbitration clause designed in a manner to
significantly disadvantage them, the weaker party.  This narrow and
specific approach will allow many others to support the legislative
initiative.
I would suggest the following as potential draft language:
The Congress finds the following:
(a) The fair and just resolution of disputes is a fundamental right for all
persons.
(b) While arbitration can be a fair and just means of resolving disputes, it
must arise within an agreement that is completed within a voluntary
and informed agreement process.
(c) Contracts of adhesion may place individuals at a disadvantage when
selecting a dispute resolution mechanism; especially concerning are
situations in which the party in the stronger bargaining position seeks
to take advantage of that position.
(d) Additional protections must be afforded to all persons entering into
contracts of adhesion when the party in the stronger bargaining posi-
tion seeks to take advantage of that position.
Chapter 4: Arbitration of Consumer Disputes164
Sec. 401. Scope and Definitions:
In this chapter—
(1) A consumer shall be protected under this Act if he/she
(a) is faced with a contract of adhesion containing an arbitration
clause, and
(b) is given no opportunity to negotiate the terms of, or reject the
insertion of, the dispute resolution clause, and
(c) has a significantly limited choice of alternative suppliers within
the region, or
(d) he/she is faced with an arbitration clause that significantly dis-
advantages him/her.
Definitions:
(1) Contract of adhesion is one in which:
(a) The contract is a standard printed contract, that is
(b) drafted or imposed by the party with the superior bargaining
power, and
(c) relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to
the contract or reject it, and
(d) contains an arbitration clause that is objectively unfairly one-sided
in favor of the drafting party, or
(e) contains a specific arbitration term or provision that would be a
surprise to a reasonable person in light of the circumstances.
(2) “Consumer Dispute” means a dispute between an individual who
seeks or acquires real or personal property, services (including ser-
164. One should appreciate that the AFA, as it stands today, also covers employment
and civil rights disputes.  These are clearly areas of legal disputes that share
some characteristics with consumers; however, these issues are substantially dif-
ferent in key areas and as such, these areas have been specifically excluded from
the language considered.
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vices relating to securities and other investments), money, or credit for
personal, family, or household purposes and the seller or provider of
such property, services, money, or credit.165
Sec. 402. Validity and Enforceability:
(a) In general, notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no arbitra-
tion agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of a
consumer dispute which arises in a contract of adhesion, unless
(1) there has been specific notice of the arbitration clause, and
(2) a plain language explanation of the clause, with an
(3) option of opting out of the arbitration clause, unless
a. the arbitration clause is designed in such a manner as to protect
the individual’s interests.  This would include, at minimum:
i. a simple and clear means of initiating the arbitration claim,
and
ii. resolving the dispute within 90 days, and
iii. requiring arbitration to take place either online or within the
domestic region of the initiating party, and
iv. requiring the business to pay the cost of arbitration should the
consumer prevail on the issue, and
v. preventing the drafting party from receiving attorney’s fees,
even if successful in the arbitration.
(b) In the interest of clarity, the above provision applies in full to arbitration
agreements, clauses, and significant modification thereof, which are:
(1) presented after the original date of contracting, or
(2) contained in subsequent mailing or similar methods of notification,
or
(3) contained in a change in terms or other similar legal instrument.
The language in this draft act would protect a narrow class of indi-
viduals from significantly disadvantageous arbitration clauses within
contracts of adhesion.  The adjustment seeks to protect the class of
individuals who need protecting without over capturing those parties
that should not be protected within the class.  Moreover, the act seeks
to provide information concerning the nature of arbitration and the
agreement while allowing the weaker party to opt out of the use of
arbitration should a dispute arise.  However, the draft act also seeks
to allow businesses to use contracts of adhesion that contain arbitra-
tion clauses, provided that such clauses are explained, apparent, and
balance power between the parties.166 Moreover, arbitration clauses
that fail to meet reasonable expectations of what arbitration should
look like are prohibited, as are significantly modifying “after the fact”
clause insertions.
165. H.R. 1873, 112th Cong., § 401(2) (2011).
166. Jeremy Senderowicz of Columbia University has advocated an amendment to the
FAA “aimed at ensuring true consent by consumers to arbitration clauses.”  Jer-
emy Senderowicz, Consumer Arbitration and Freedom to Contract: A Proposal to
Facilitate Consumers’ Informed Consent to Arbitration Clauses in Form Con-
tracts, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 275, 279 (1999).  His proposal is to require
that any arbitration clause present in a consumer contract be accompanied by a
detailed explanation of the procedural differences between arbitration and court-
based conflict resolution, along with an explanation to the consumer of the rights
she is signing away. See id. at 278–79.
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Applying this draft act to the facts in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion167 would likely result in the arbitration clause being enforcea-
ble: an outcome that seems just under the circumstances.  First,
although the Concepcions might successfully argue that they were not
provided with a specific notice about the existence of the arbitration
clause, the clause was designed in such a manner as to shift the arbi-
tration clause in favor of the consumer.  The clause in AT&T Mobil-
ity168 was incredibly consumer-friendly (provided the claim was not a
frivolous one) and this shift of power makes the main purpose behind
protections afforded consumers suspect under the circumstances.  In
addition, the Concepcions did not lack choice, as various mobile phone
providers had alternative provisions available to them within the re-
gion.  Plus, they were not faced with an “after the fact” or significantly
modified arbitration clause.  The Concepcions had choices and their
position was not one that the draft act seeks to protect as those choices
also create a situation in which a contract of adhesion is not
unreasonable.
In relation to the updated Sony Terms of Service,169 the draft act
would also not prohibit Sony from inserting an arbitration clause—or
an anti-class-action arbitration clause—within its revised Terms of
Service.  In fact, Sony’s actions would be allowed under the draft act.
In the Sony example, although customers face an insertion of an arbi-
tration clause and an anti-class-action arbitration clause, the cus-
tomer can easily opt out of both clauses.  This is the precarious
balance that the draft act attempts to address—businesses’ need to
protect their interest through the use of contracts of adhesion that
contain arbitration clauses, and customers need to be protected from
167. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011).
168. Id.  As the Supreme Court describes:
The revised agreement provides that customers may initiate dispute pro-
ceedings by completing a one-page Notice of Dispute form available on
AT&T’s Web site.  AT&T may then offer to settle the claim; if it does not,
or if the dispute is not resolved within 30 days, the customer may invoke
arbitration by filing a separate Demand for Arbitration, also available on
AT&T’s Web site.  In the event the parties proceed to arbitration, the
agreement specifies that AT&T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous
claims; that arbitration must take place in the county in which the cus-
tomer is billed; that, for claims of $10,000 or less, the customer may
choose whether the arbitration proceeds in person, by telephone, or
based only on submissions; that either party may bring a claim in small
claims court in lieu of arbitration; and that the arbitrator may award
any form of individual relief, including injunctions and presumably puni-
tive damages.  The agreement, moreover, denies AT&T any ability to
seek reimbursement of its attorney’s fees, and, in the event that a cus-
tomer receives an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last written
settlement offer, requires AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and
twice the amount of the claimant’s attorney’s fees.
Id. at 1744 (citing the Brief for the Petitioner at 7).
169. Sony Network Entertainment, supra note 143.
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significantly disadvantageous arbitration clauses.  By allowing an opt-
out, the Sony clause does not seek to take advantage of its more pow-
erful position.  Nothing in the clause suggests that Sony seeks to use
its more powerful bargaining position to take advantage of the cus-
tomer.  Sony sent emails notifying its customers of the change, al-
lowed customers to opt out, and set up a JAMS or AAA process of
arbitration.170  Customers should not expect protection from clauses
that do not arise from the more powerful party taking advantage of its
position, even if it is inserting an arbitration clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Federal Arbitration Act has been expanded through numerous
court decisions with the support of business and consumers.  The Su-
preme Court has continued to be firm in its holding that state law may
allow the parties to craft their arbitration agreement as they see fit.
However, states may not alter the basic rules of contract in such a
manner as to have a disproportionate impact on the enforceability of
an arbitration agreement, nor may the law require the parties to par-
ticipate in an arbitration procedure that does not comport with the
parties’ expectations of what arbitration is to look like and accomplish.
The parties are free to alter these expectations within their agree-
ment; however, the state may not unilaterally make the alteration.
This leaves little room for debate.  If consumers, Congress, and the
arbitration community are concerned about the insertion of arbitra-
tion clauses that seek to take advantage of business’s stronger bar-
gaining position, Congress must legislate a change to the protections
afforded weaker parties facing arbitration clauses in contracts of ad-
hesion.  However, Congress must ensure its legislation is focused on
protecting a narrow class of individuals needing protection when faced
with a contract of adhesion that contains an arbitration clause de-
signed in a manner to significantly disadvantage the weaker party.
This narrow and specific approach will allow many others to support
the legislative initiative.  We cannot allow biases against arbitration
to overtake the creation of legislation that protects weaker parties
from the insertion of arbitration clauses into contracts of adhesion,
when the arbitration clause significantly benefits the drafting party.
170. The Knowledge Center at Sony helped explain the process and the content of the
email to Sony customers. See You have not accepted the latest version of the
PlayStation®Network Terms of Service, PLAYSTATION®NETWORK, http://us.play
station.com/support/answer/?a_id=4235 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012); accord
Devin Coldewey, Sony’s New PSN Terms Of Service Prevent You From Joining
Class Action Suits Against Sony, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 16, 2011), http://techcrunch
.com/2011/09/16/sonys-new-psn-terms-of-service-prevent-you-from-joining-class-
action-suits-against-sony/; Brendan Sinclair, Sony sued over terms of service up-
date, GAMESPOT (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.gamespot.com/news/sony-sued-over-
terms-of-service-update-6347852.
